Griffin v. State
NO. 10-05176-CRF-361
Case Summary written by Frederick C. Hutterer, Staff Member.
JUDGE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court, in which JUDGE KEASLER, JUDGE HERVEY, JUDGE ALCALA, JUDGE RICHARDSON, AND JUDGE NEWELL joined. JUDGE YEARY filed a dissenting opinion, in which PRESIDING JUDGE KELLER and JUDGE MEYERS joined.
Griffin was charged with intentionally causing the death of Jennifer Hailey while attempting to kidnap her son on September 19, 2010. In June of 2012, a jury convicted Griffin of the capital murder of Hailey. The trial judge sentenced him to death.
Griffin argued that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that he murdered Hailey in order to facilitate a kidnapping. Griffin also asserted that he murdered Hailey before he did anything to her son, who he harmed to prevent the discovery of Hailey’s murder.
Issue: Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Griffin murdered Hailey in the course of kidnapping her son.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that Griffin was guilty of capital murder, remanding the case for a reformation of judgment pursuant to a murder conviction and for a new punishment trial.
The court reasoned that Griffin did not physically restrain Hailey’s son during the commission of the murder. It was not until the murder was completed that Griffin restricted the boy’s movements without consent while substantially interfering with his freedom of movement. Furthermore, Griffin did not exhibit an intent to confine the boy, but rather an intent to kill him in order to eliminate a witness. The record did not reflect an intent to kidnap Hailey’s son, and that during the attempt, Griffin murdered her. The court stated that Griffin did not know the boy was in the apartment until after the murder. The court found that the child was assaulted, but not kidnapped because he freely approached Griffin after the murder, and was not restrained until Griffin commenced his assault.
The Court concluded that because Griffin committed the murder prior to his attack on Hailey’s son, and because Griffin did not restrain the boy until his assault, capital murder did not occur. The court asserted that because the evidence was sufficient to find that Griffin murdered Hailey, reformation of the judgment was appropriate.
JUDGE YEARY, in which PRESIDING JUDGE KELLER and JUDGE MEYERS joined, dissenting.
Judge Yeary argued that the statutory language of the Texas Penal Code does not necessarily require that the murder facilitate the predicated offense. Judge Yeary further stated that he would have held that murders do not need to facilitate a predicate offense to be committed in the course of the predicate crime. Lastly, Judge Yeary asserted that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Griffin kidnapped Hailey’s son because he restrained him with the intent to abduct while still engaging in the conduct that caused Hailey’s death.
In a point of error, Griffin claimed that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by allowing the prosecutor to introduce his failure to testify into evidence through Griffin’s expert witness, who stated that Griffin refused to speak to him about the offense. Judge Yeary asserted that Griffin constructively waived his Fifth Amendment rights by speaking to his expert witness and introducing testimony based upon the interview at trial, permitting the state to offer rebuttal testimony.
Griffin also argued that the jury’s finding that he was not mentally retarded was against the great weight of the evidence and manifestly unjust. Judge Yeary stated that because there was significant evidence on both sides of the issue, the court must defer to the fact-finder, which found that Griffin was not mentally retarded.
In another point of error, Griffin claimed that the lower court erred by instructing the jury to consider the circumstances surrounding the offense, which may have militated for or against capital punishment. Griffin argued that this instruction would permit the jury to consider his low mental capacity as militating in favor of the death penalty in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Griffin did not object to this instruction. Judge Yeary concluded that even if the jury instruction was erroneous, Griffin was not egregiously harmed. The State did not claim that Griffin’s low intelligence was an aggravating factor. Judge Yeary found that Griffin was not egregiously harmed by the jury instruction because did not permit the jury to find this special issue in the negative while finding that Griffin was mentally retarded but also believing that his mental retardation militated in favor of capital punishment.