Court of Criminal Appeals Update: Murray v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals

Court of Criminal Appeals

Murray v. State

No. PD-1230-14

Case Summary written by David Miles, Staff Member.

JUDGE HERVEY delivered the opinion of the court in which PRESIDING JUDGE KELLER, JUDGE JOHNSON, JUDGE KEASLER, JUDGE ALCALA, JUDGE RICHARDSON, JUDGE YEARY, and JUDGE NEWELL joined.

Chad William Murray was convicted of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to “one-year confinement in the county jail and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine.” His confinement was suspended and he was instead placed on community supervision for two years.

The court of appeals reversed the decision based on appellant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he was operating a vehicle. Murray was arrested on January 16, 2011, while passed out behind the wheel of his car with the engine running. There was no alcohol in the car and Murray was not found near any establishment that served alcohol.

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate court on the grounds that there was sufficient evidence to convict Murray on the charge of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. The standard of review applied in this case was “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).

The court held that a fact finder could have reasonably inferred that Murray had become intoxicated elsewhere based on his admission that he had been drinking, the arresting officer’s observation that he was very intoxicated, and the fact that no alcohol was found in or around Murray’s truck. Additionally, since no other people were in the area, the court held that a fact finder could reasonably infer that Murray “drove his vehicle to the location at which he was found after drinking to intoxication.”

JUDGE MEYERS filed a dissenting opinion.

Judge Meyers dissented to explain his dissatisfaction with the type of inference described by the majority. Further, Judge Meyers stated that he was “aware of no possession case where [the court has] allowed this type of attenuated inference, and [the court] should not allow it now in this driving while intoxicated case.”

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