In re Tyrone Allen
NOS. WR-82,265-01 & WR-82,265-02
Case Summary written by Jordan Stevens, Staff Member.
JUDGE KEASLER delivered the opinion of the court, in which JUDGES MYERS, HERVEY, RICHARDSON, and YEARY joined.
Tyrone Allen was indicted twice for capital murder and faced the possibility of being sentenced to death if found guilty of either charge. In a pretrial motion, Allen sought a pretrial hearing to determine whether he was intellectually disabled and, as a result, ineligible to receive the death penalty. Upon Allen’s request, the trial judge held a hearing and granted his motion. In response, the state petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for mandamus relief, but was denied. The state then looked to the Dallas Court of Appeals for mandamus relief.
The appellate court first directed its analysis at Texas Court of Criminal Appeals precedent and determined that a finding of intellectual disability is an issue of fact. Next, the appellate court looked to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and focused its analysis on three specific statutes: (1) Article 37.071, § 2, “stating that once a jury finds a capital defendant guilty, the court must conduct a sentencing proceeding ‘before the jury trial’”; (2) Articles 1.13(a) and 1.14(a), “providing that a defendant facing the death penalty may not waive a jury trial on punishment”; and (3) Article 36.13, “mandating that ‘[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code, the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts.’” The appellate court granted the state mandamus relief because it concluded that, when read together, the three aforementioned statutes dictate that the question of whether or not a defendant is intellectually disabled must be answered by the same jury that determines the guilt or innocence of a defendant. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals then granted Allen’s motion for leave to obtain mandamus relief and challenge the court of appeals’ judgment.
Issue: How and when should it be determined whether or not a defendant is intellectually disabled?
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals began by reviewing the two pronged test used to determine whether mandamus relief is appropriate. The court stated that a relator must establish that (1) the relator has no adequate remedy at law to redress the harm he alleges, and (2) that what he seeks to compel is a ministerial act as opposed to a discretionary or judicial decision. The court concluded that the second prong was dispositive in Allen’s case because it requires the relator to show the law invoked is “definite, unambiguous, and unquestionably applies to the indisputable facts of the case.”
The court then reviewed and rejected the appellate court’s interpretation of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The court held that Article 37.07, § 2, was not on point because that statute only applies when the state seeks the death penalty and there is no way to know whether the state is still seeking the death penalty when a jury finds a defendant guilty of capital murder. The court concluded that Articles 1.13(a) and 1.14(a) are irrelevant because Allen’s pretrial motion did not operate as a jury-trial waiver. Finally, the court dispensed with Article 36.13 by noting that none of the court’s precedents have ever invoked this particular article when addressing the issue of which factfinder should determine whether a defendant is intellectually disabled.
The court then turned its analysis to its precedent regarding intellectually disabled criminals and the death penalty. The court began by acknowledging that the “stop-gap” definition of intellectual disability created in Ex parte Briseno is still good law. The court then discussed Hunter v. State, which it found to be the most informative authority on the issue before the court. In Hunter, a factually similar case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “because there is no legislation or constitutional requirement directing when or by whom an intellectual disability determination is to be made,” the trial judge did not err in denying Hunter’s request for a pretrial intellectual-disability determination. Finally, the court addressed the suggestion that State ex. Rel. Lykos v. Fine and State ex rel. Watkins v. Cruezot require the court to issue mandamus. The court noted the differences between this case and those cases and concluded that a denial of Allen’s motion was not “positively commanded and so plainly prescribed under the law as to be free from doubt.” The court also considered whether Allen’s motion was ripe for review and determined that it was because of the immediate and substantial effect the state’s notice in seeking the death penalty has on the case.
The court concluded that the law surrounding the judge’s action was not clear enough for mandamus relief to be appropriate. The court lamented the fact that, like all other mandamus cases, this case had to be decided based solely upon the existing law and, as such, the court was not in a position to interpret statutes, clarify Texas Court of Criminal Appeals precedent, or create new law. The court then responded to Judge Alcala’s dissent by noting that it was not bound by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.2(b). The court finished by calling for legislation prescribing a procedure for determining whether or not a defendant is intellectually-disabled.
JUDGE MEYERS, concurring.
Judge Meyers wrote separately to address his disagreement with the dissenting opinions.
JUDGE YEARY, concurring.
Judge Yeary wrote separately to highlight the problems created by the United States Supreme Court’s decision to make intellectually-disabled defendants immune from the death penalty, and to call for a legislative fix. He summarized the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Atkins v. Virginia and reviewed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ response. He pointed out the many problems with the current definition of intellectually-disabled used by courts and called for legislative guidance in this area. He concluded by issuing a warning that many more problems are likely to arise if legislative guidance is not provided soon.
JUDGE ALCALA, dissenting.
Judge Alcala dissented because she believes that the trial judge’s decision to deny Allen’s pretrial motion should be abated so that the new judge could have the opportunity to reconsider his predecessor’s ruling. Judge Alcala supported this proposition by surveying the law governing abatement and concluded that mandamus relief was inappropriate because there was not a live controversy between the parties. Judge Alcala argued that, even if the original judge’s decision should not be abated, the relator’s request for mandamus relief should be denied. She argued this was so because “a trial court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a pretrial hearing on intellectual disability because that issue is not ripe until the punishment phase of trial.” In support of this position, she cited numerous statutes and Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases which she believes to be dispositive in this case.
JUDGE NEWELL, joined by PRESIDING JUDGE KELLER, and JUDGE ALCALA, dissenting.
Judge Newell believed that this issue was not ripe for review and that the majority essentially empowered trial courts to issue an advisory opinion. He believed that Fine and Creuzot are not distinguishable from the present case as the majority suggested and, as such, their reasoning is dispositive in this case. Therefore, whether or not a defendant is intellectually-disabled is a sentencing issue which is not ripe for review until after a finding of guilt.