In re Medina
No. WR-75,835-02
Case Summary written by Katherine Mendiola, Staff Member.
JUDGE NEWELL delivered the opinion of the court.
Defendant Medina was tried for murder. During the sentencing phase of his trial, the prosecutor’s motion for continuance was granted to accommodate juror absences. Medina’s trial counsel filed a motion for mistrial on the basis that the continuance caused several out-of-country witnesses to be rendered unavailable. The motion was denied and Medina’s trial counsel subsequently moved to withdraw from the case, due to the belief that she could not provide effective assistance of counsel, which was denied. Medina’s counsel did not present any evidence during the sentencing phase and was held in contempt of court for failure to participate in the trial. Medina was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. Medina appealed his sentence, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals confirmed his conviction.
After Medina’s first habeas petition failed due to insufficient pleadings, the Court of Criminal Appeals appointed counsel from the Office of Capital Writs, who then pursued the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The habeas judge called for an evidentiary hearing in which the State called Medina as a witness. Medina filed a writ of prohibition and claimed a Fifth Amendment right against being called as a witness.
The issue before the court was whether it was a ministerial or judicial decision to allow Medina to testify in a post-conviction evidentiary hearing.
Whether Medina was entitled to Fifth Amendment protections as a matter of law in the habeas proceeding was an issue of first impression for the court. The court ultimately determined that the Fifth Amendment did not apply in the instant case because after a criminal conviction, the focus of the Fifth Amendment protection shifts to protecting the defendant against future criminal liability. Although the court stipulated there may be situations that warrant Fifth Amendment protections in post-conviction proceedings.
Secondly, the court analyzed the requisite elements for a writ of prohibition. First, a defendant must show that the decision before the court is a ministerial decision, one not requiring judicial discretion. Secondly, a defendant must show there is no other remedy at law. The court denied the writ of prohibition and asserted that a writ of prohibition was not required in Medina’s case, in which he was asked to testify in a post-conviction hearing before a habeas judge. The habeas judge has discretion to resolve fact issues, and because the Fifth Amendment did not apply to Medina, it was within the realm of judicial discretion to decide that Medina could testify in the habeas proceeding. Therefore, the court concluded that Medina did not meet the burden of proof required for granting the writ of prohibition claim.
JUDGE JOHNSON filed a concurring opinion.
Judge Johnson’s concurring opinion was filed to clearly delineate the difference between the Fifth Amendment as a right and not a privilege. The Fifth Amendment is a right under the United States and Texas constitution and should be referred to as such.
JUDGE ALCALA dissented.
Judge Alcala believed the court should have granted the writ of prohibition to forbid the habeas judge from compelling Medina’s testimony, due to Fifth Amendment protections. Judge Alcala relied on legislative intent to conclude there is a necessary distinction between habeas proceedings in death penalty versus non-death penalty cases. If a proceeding is in a death penalty case, a defendant’s habeas proceedings should be considered part of the defendant’s case, warranting additional protections. Further, even if the habeas proceeding were considered civil, the Fifth Amendment still applied in the instant case because an inquiry into the defense strategy could lead to statements that “. . . may be incuplatory,” in which even an offer of immunity is not sufficient to protect.