Supreme Court clarifies defamation standard

Julia WisenbergVolume 50 Articles Editor

JUDGE DEVINE DELIVERED THE OPTINION OF THE COURT.

The Texas Supreme Court was divided in a defamation case involving accusations of intoxication and inappropriate familial connections. The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Klentzman, a defamation case involving public concern, the proper standard to determine defamation would be falsity and actual malice.

The case involved an individual suing a journalist and newspaper for defamation after an article detailed“unruly and intoxicated” interactions with a State Trooper. The article also mentioned multiple other alleged encounters, some involving inappropriate involvement by his father, Chief Deputy of a county sheriff’s office, in his son’s criminal acts. The petitioner disputed the truth of these claims and brought a libel suit against the media defendants.

In the jury trial, the jury was improperly instructed to determine whether the journalist had acted with malice. The court defined this as a conscious indifference or intent to cause injury—rather than determining if she acted with reckless disregard for the truth and knowledge of falsity. Under this improper standard, the jury concluded that the journalist had acted with malice and awarded $50,000 in mental anguish and reputational damages. The jury also awarded exemplary damages. The First Court of Appeals remanded the defamation case for a new trial after holding that the jury charge given was not constitutionally compliant. The appellate court also concluded that insufficient evidence was established for exemplary damages, but legally sufficient evidence existed for an award of actual damages. Both parties appealed.

In a 5–4 decision, which affirmed the First Court of Appeals’ judgment, the Supreme Court first held that this case involved a matter of public concern. The Court explained that since the alleged wrongdoings involved public officials such as Chief Brady, the petitioner’s father, it was a subject of legitimate news interest. Thus, the petitioner was required to prove falsity and actual malice. Since the jury instructions did not require this finding from the jury, the Court held that the court of appeals properly reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

Lastly, the Court rejected the media defendants’ argument that the appellate court should have rendered judgment in its favor because no evidence of damages existed. The Court cited in the record that the petitioner was asked to resign shortly after the article appeared and some members of the community had an unfavorable view of him once the article was published. Thus, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to award actual damages against the media defendants.

The dissent took issue with the Court’s latter holding—that legally sufficient evidence existed of actual damages. After analyzing the record, the dissent concluded that there was no compelling evidence to conclude that the petitioner suffered injury to his reputation or mental anguish. The dissenting judges pointed to insufficient evidence of causation between the publication of the article and harm to the petitioner’s reputation or a change in his mental state. Based on these conclusions, the dissent would have rendered judgment in favor of the media defendants.

Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2017).

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