Molina v. Alvarado
No. 14-0536
Case Summary written by Allison Grayson, Online Edition Editor.
Elias Alvarado filed a lawsuit against the City of McCamey for negligence and negligence per se after an accident with Jesus Molina. Alvarado claimed that Molina “was driving a city vehicle under the influence of alcohol when he struck Alvarado’s vehicle.” In suing the City, Alvarado argued that Molina was working within the scope of his employment with the City when the accident occurred. Furthermore, Alvarado argued that the city operated the vehicle in a negligent manner through its employee.
Alvarado’s petition did not describe how Molina’s actions connected with his employment duties. Moreover, the City argued that it was immune from suit because the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) did not waive the City’s immunity. When the trial court denied “Alvarado’s special exceptions requesting that the City state the factual and legal basis of its immunity defense, Alvarado filed a first amended petition naming Molina as an additional defendant.” After including Molina, Alvarado argued that Molina should be liable in his individual capacity, should the court not find that Molina was furthering the affairs of the City.
In response, “Molina filed a general denial and requested summary judgment, seeking dismissal under subsection (a) of the TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision.” Molina argued that Alvarado was barred from suing him after making an irrevocable election to sue the City. The trial court denied the motion, which the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals explained “that subsection (a) ‘is correctly read as barring suit against an employee only where that employee is being sued in his official capacity[.]’” Further, the “court of appeals concluded that the existence of material fact questions regarding whether Molina was ‘actually driving the City of McCamey vehicle within the scope of his employment or under the influence of alcohol . . . prevent[ed] a grant of summary judgment.’”
The Court explained that the TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision “conditions the immunity waiver on the plaintiff’s forfeiture of any negligence claims against the employee in his individual capacity.” Additionally, when the plaintiff decides between suing the employee in his individual capacity or the City, “subsection (a) or (b) will ‘immediately and forever’ bar him from subsequently electing to sue the other regarding the same subject matter.”
Discussing subsection (f), the Court stated that the suit is considered to be against the employee in his official capacity if the plaintiff files a suit against an employee working within the scope of his employment, when the plaintiff could have brought the suit against the governmental unit. A suit based on conduct falling within the scope of employment is virtually a suit against the governmental unit in question. Contrastingly, a suit against an employee working outside the scope of his employment constitutes a suit against the employee in his individual capacity.
In this instance, the Court determined that Alvarado made an irrevocable election to sue the City and “the TTCA [barred] him from later filing suit against Molina.” The Court explained that if Alvarado required more information in deciding whether Molina’s actions were within the scope of his employment, “the prudent choice would have been to sue Molina, and await a factual resolution on that question.” Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and rendered judgment for Molina.