Jaganathan v. State
No. PD-1189-14
Case Summary written by Mariah Mauck, Staff Member.
PRESIDING JUDGE KELLER delivered the opinion of the court in which JUDGES KEASLER, HERVEY, ALCALA, RICHARDSON, and YEARLY joined. JUDGES JOHNSON and JUDGE NEWELL concurred.
State Trooper Thomas Norsworthy conducted a traffic stop after observing appellant Francheska V. Jaganathan pass a “Left Lane for Passing Only” sign and remain in the left lane with without passing. Because Trooper Norsworthy smelled marijuana during the course of the stop, the trooper searched appellant’s vehicle and found marijuana in the trunk. Thus, appellant was charged with possession of marijuana. At trial, appellant’s motion to suppress was denied and, pursuant to an agreement, she pled guilty and was placed on deferred adjudication.
On appeal, appellant claimed that Trooper Norsworthy lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The court of appeals agreed after considering a number of facts shown in the video and concluding that the record did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion.
Issue: Whether the facts surrounding the conduct of appellant combined in a way that made it unreasonable for the trooper to think she was violating the law.
The State argued that the court of appeals erred in suggesting potential justifications for appellant’s failure to immediately move out of the left lane after passing the “Left Lane for Passing Only” sign. The State did not think those potential justifications negated the existence of reasonable suspicion that an offense occurred. Furthermore, the State said such justifications might entitle appellant to an instruction on necessity if she were being tried for a traffic violation, but their significance is disputed when the issue is whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant.
The court agreed with the State, finding three issues with the court of appeals’ decision. First, the court of appeals did not view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. The court suggested possible reasons that appellant might have remained in the left lane, but an officer’s suspicion is not unreasonable just because facts surrounding a suspected offense could demonstrate a defense to conduct. Second, there is a difference between what an officer sees during an ongoing event and what is seen when reviewing a video. Because of that difference, the reasonable suspicion standard “accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people,” and reasonable suspicion is not negated by the possibility that conduct is allowed by law. Lastly, the court of appeals incorrectly considered the purpose of the law against driving in the left lane without passing. The trooper was not required to consider the purpose of the law when deciding whether appellant had violated it, and law enforcement officials are free to enforce the laws and detain violators as long as an actual violation occurs.
Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, concluding that the court of appeals erred in holding that Trooper Norsworthy lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop.
JUDGE MEYERS, dissenting.
Judge Meyers argued appellant’s actions in this case could not constitute a crime at all because it is unclear how to comply with the “Left Lane for Passing Only” sign and when an individual’s actions would become criminal activity. He posed questions such as whether a driver in the left lane must intend to pass a vehicle and how the State could ever prove that intent; whether a driver must actually pass another vehicle and if the pass must occur in a specified time; and whether a driver is required to immediately move back into the right lane after passing another vehicle, or remain in the left lane in anticipation of passing an additional vehicle. Because of the existence of these questions, Judge Meyers believes reasonable suspicion should not be based on a crime that no one understands how to or not to commit. Additionally, he argued that the presence of a sign that provides no actual notice or instruction equates to having no sign at all. Moreover, there can be no reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred if there is no sign within reasonable distance of the traffic stop. Therefore, Judge Meyers would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals because appellant should not have been pulled over and her motion to suppress the evidence found in her car should have been granted.