Absalon v. State
N0. PD-0340-14
Case Summary written by Jana L. Simons, Staff Member.
JUDGE MEYERS delivered the opinion of the court, in which JUDGE KEASLER, JUDGE HERVEY, JUDGE ALCALA, JUDGE RICHARDSON, and JUDGE YEARY joined. PRESIDING JUDGE KELLER, JUDGE JOHNSON, and JUDGE NEWELL concurred.
In 1984 Ginger Hayden was murdered. In an unrelated 1986 case, the appellant plead guilty to a charge of criminal mischief that resulted in probation and required him to complete a substance abuse program as a condition of the agreement. During the appellant’s time in rehabilitation, he purportedly admitted to the 1984 murder, which remained unresolved. In 2010, the appellant was arrested and charged with the murder of Ginger Hayden. During trial, testimony from three fellow substance abuse program participants alleged that the appellant provided various details of how he concealed himself in the victim’s home, and once she was asleep, he emerged and stabbed her to death. DNA evidence facilitated the appellant’s murder conviction resulting in a sentence of life incarceration in 2012.
Both the Texas Rules of Evidence and Code of Criminal Procedure stipulate that evidence provided at voluntary treatment is inadmissible at trial. The appellant filed a motion to strike the testimony from evidence based on the voluntary nature of the treatment but the trial court refused to grant the motion. The trial court determined that the appellant participated in a substance-abuse program ordered by the court as a result of his criminal mischief plea agreement and was simply an avoidance of jail time; thus the rehabilitation was involuntary. Following the conviction and sentencing, the defendant appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the appellant’s substance abuse treatment was voluntary in order to necessitate the exclusion of the evidence.
In addition to arguing that the treatment was voluntary, the appellant referred to the plea agreement in the context of a voluntary contract and asserted that information divulged at the substance abuse program was bound by the confidentiality of the patients. On the other hand, the state argued that the rehabilitation program was a compulsory element of his plea agreement and because the deal was generally accepted to be the lesser punishment between incarceration or probation, the appellant was in fact presented only one option. Because the alternatives were unbalanced in favor of the probation, failing to accept the plea agreement did not constitute a viable option.
The court ultimately agreed with the state’s position that because completion of the program was an element of the agreement, it was involuntary. Additionally, the court clarified the dichotomy of a voluntary patient and a patient agreeing to attend a substance abuse program to avoid greater consequences; the latter encompassed the appellant in this case. The court stated that if a patient, who submits freely and willingly to rehabilitation in an effort to better one’s life, chooses to leave, he or she may do so. Alternatively, the consequence of the appellant’s early departure from the program would be incarceration. Thus, his participation in the program was not analogous to a voluntary participant. In reality, the appellant was bound by the contractual agreement and repercussions of the arrangement. Therefore, a voluntary agreement does not necessarily imply voluntary treatment.
Finally, the court determined that because the facility provided the rehabilitation service, not the court, the patient was not entitled to confidentiality. The actual agreement between the appellant and the court made no mention of an agreement of confidentiality. Therefore, the court concluded that the information provided during testimony of the appellant’s fellow rehabilitation patients was effectively obtained during involuntary treatment and not subject to confidentiality.