Owens v. State
No. 06-13-00199-CR
Case Summary written by Kayla Hackerott, Staff Member.
JUDGE HERVEY delivered the opinion of the court, joined by PRESIDING JUDGE KELLER, and JUDGES MEYERS, JOHNSON, KEASLER, RICHARDSON, YEARY, and NEWELL.
Police pulled over Appellant, Charles Ray Owens, who had his fourteen-year-old son in the car at the time, for speeding. During the traffic stop, the officer discovered an outstanding arrest warrant for Owens from Michigan. While waiting for confirmation of the warrant, the officer allowed Owens to drive his son home. As Owens approached his residence, he slowed the vehicle, dropping his son off, and sped away at a high rate of speed. The officer engaged in pursuit but slowed his vehicle because of the pedestrians in the residential neighborhood. As Owens approached the highway intersection, the officer observed the vehicle jump into the air as a result of the vehicle hitting something. Owens had run a stop sign, crashing into two vehicles. One of the drivers of the vehicles that Own hit died at the scene of severe head injuries.
After the State charged Owens with felony murder, the defense filed a motion challenging Owens’s competency to stand trial. The defense argued that Owens lacked competency because he suffered from a traumatic brain injury that caused amnesia, preventing him from remembering the car crash. In support of the competency claim, the defense requested to have Dr. Allen Thomas appointed to evaluate Owens and the judge agreed. Allen concluded that even if Owens suffered from amnesia, Owens’s competency remained intact because he could rationally understand the consultations with his attorney and the proceedings against him.
During the competency trial, the defense called Allen as its first witness. The defense questioned Allen extensively about his credentials, eventually objecting to Allen as an expert because he failed to meet the statutory requirements for the qualifications of an expert appointed to testify regarding competency. The trial judge overruled the objection because the defense counsel prepared the order appointing Allen as the competency expert. Defense counsel argued, and the judge agreed, that the defense should be able to argue that Allen lacked the qualifications necessary to evaluate Owens. Despite the defenses argument that Allen lacked the proper qualifications for the court to appoint as an expert, the jury found Owens competent to stand trial, convicted Owens of felony murder, and sentenced Owens for forty years in prison.
Owens appealed claiming that the trial court erred by allowing Allen to testify as to Owens’s competency and that the error harmed Owens. On appeal, the State argued that Owens should not receive a windfall because the defense failed to review Allen’s credential before requesting his appointment. The court of appeals ruled in favor of the defense because the failure to sustain the defense’s objection to Allen harmed Owens since the only evidence against Owens’s alleged incompetency came from the testimony of Allen. The court rejected the State’s invited-error argument reasoning that the defense counsel, being unfamiliar with Allen, prepared the motion appointing Allen as expert only on the recommendation of the prosecution, and that defense counsel timely objected upon discovering that Allen lacked the necessary qualifications. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial because of the flaw in determination of Owens’s competence. Because the court granted a new trial based on the defense’s competency claim, the court did not examine Owens’s other claim of an alleged evidentiary variance.
The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition for review to determine if the court of appeals erred in reversing and remanding for a new trial instead of abating the appeal and ordering a new competency trial. The court ruled that the appeals court erred in reversing and remanding for a new trial. The court reasoned that while a subsequent determination of incompetence renders a trial invalid on due process grounds, if, upon remand, the trial court determines that a retrospective competency evaluation is possible, and the new proceeding finds the defendant competent then the conviction remains, as no due-process violation exists. The court determined that the appeals court erred since it could not have known whether the trial would be rendered invalid because the appeals court failed to abate the appeal and remand to the trial court to determine the feasibility of a retrospective competency proceeding.
The court also ruled, however, that they need not abate the appeal and remand for a new competency determination because the trial court’s error was harmless. The Court’s examination of the record yielded only one piece of evidence pointing to Owens’s incompetence, namely his attorney’s testimony that the amnesia affected Owens’s ability to rationally communicate about the events. On the other hand, the Court found more illuminating a four-page letter written by Owens to the trial judge expressing remorse, explaining his amnesia, and his belief that a vehicular manslaughter charge would be more appropriate. The court disagreed with the appellate court’s determination that that letter did not suffice as evidence that Owens possessed sufficient competency to stand trial. The court determined that Owen’s argument in the letter for a vehicular manslaughter charge as opposed to murder provided compelling evidence that he had a rational understanding of the proceedings against him. Additionally, the court found that defense counsel failed to argue that he could not presently and rationally communicate with Owens, only that Owens’s incompetence arose from his lack of recollection of the wreck. Despite the defense’s claims that the amnesia prevented the preparation of a mens rea defense, the court held that the defense could rely on the circumstances of the offense to develop such a defense.
Ultimately, for the above reasons, the court found that the appellate court erred in reversing the conviction and remanding for a new trial, and that any error by the trial court in allowing Allen to testify was harmless. The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded to address Owens’s additional point of error.
JUDGE ALCALA, dissenting.
Judge Alcala dissented because she did not believe that the letter by Owens, written to the judge who presided over his trial, showed Owens’s competency in light of the fact that no qualified expert testified to establish such competency. Judge Alcala believed that the sole question was whether the admission of the unqualified expert testimony harmed Owens because the competency hearing contained flaws¾which the majority opinion did not dispute. Judge Alcala believed that without qualified expert testimony the inadequacy of the other evidence precluded a finding of competence.
While Judge Alcala agreed with the majority that the letter demonstrated that Owens had a rational understanding of the proceedings, she concluded that the statute requires more, namely, that the “defendant can disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind, and whether he can testify.” Judge Alcala agreed with the court of appeals that the letter could not speak to these factors and that she could not infer that the defendant was competent merely because he can recount what he was shown on a video recording of the events. Discounting the improper testimony of Allen, Judge Alcala believed the letter failed to address all the statutory criteria that must be considered, and as such, could not serve as evidence of the harmlessness of the error.
Additionally, Alcala believed that the court misconstrued Allen’s testimony. Judge Alcala interpreted Allen’s testimony to be that Owen did not have any knowledge of the facts of the event. Considering the possibility that the majority’s opinion was really holding that amnesia is an insufficient basis for finding any defendant incompetent, Judge Alcala suggested that the court should analyze and support that argument while noting that the court has never held such.
Judge Alcala concluded that the presumption of competency is inadequate to maintain a finding of competence where no appointment of a qualified expert occurs, despite a statutory requirement for such appointment, and no other evidence sufficiently establishes the statutory criteria for competence.