Ramsey v. State
PD-0070-15
Case Summary written by Jack Fulgham, Staff Member.
JUDGE HERVEY delivered the opinion of the court in which PRESIDING JUDGE KELLER, JUDGES JOHNSON, KEASLER, RICHARDSON, YEARY, and NEWELL joined. JUDGE ALCALA concurred.
Jimmie and his son Jed Owens founded and operated Owens Motor Machine (Owens), a sole proprietorship located in Texas. During the time period relevant to this appeal, Appellant Donald Ramsey was the only employee of Owens, and had been allowed to live in the business shop. As compensation for his labor, Jimmie wrote checks to Ramsey payable to a checking account for Owens Motor Machine. Jimmie testified that he usually signed the checks “J.E. Owens” but sometimes signed “Jimmie E. Owens” or “Jimmie Owens,” and he typically wrote “contract labor” in the memorandum line. Jimmie kept the checkbook in his truck that he usually left unlocked in the business shop overnight.
On June 11, 2013, Ramsey tendered a $65 check payable to himself at a liquor store located a block and a half from the business shop. The check was signed “Jim E. Owens” and listed “contract labor” in the memorandum.
After being found guilty of forgery by the district court, the court of appeals reversed the judgment holding that there was a lack of sufficient evidence to prove that Ramsey intentionally defrauded Owens. The court relied on Stuebgen v. State, which held that appellant’s access to the victim’s checkbook and the fact that the victim paid his employees personally was not enough “to discharge the State’s burden of showing that appellant acted with intent ‘to defraud or harm another.’” Because the court likened the facts of the case to Stuebgen, the court reasoned that any inference that the appellant had knowledge of the check’s forgery was speculative.
In his dissent, Justice Pirtle argued that Stuebgen could be distinguished from the case because “there was no memorandum on the check stating the purpose for which the check was given.” Pirtle concluded that Williams v. State controlled this case rather than Stuebgen. Like Williams, Ramsey attempted to tender the check with a specific purpose by writing “contract labor” into the memorandum. This, along with the fact that Ramsey was an employee with access to the checkbook and had tendered similar checks at the liquor store before, was enough for the state to meet its burden that Ramsey attempted to intentionally defraud Owens Motor Machine. Furthermore, Pirtle argued that Jackson had abandoned the reasonable-alternative-hypothesis standard that the Stuebgen court relied on, and therefore Stuebgen was inapplicable.
The Court of Criminal Appeals only had to decide the issue of whether Ramsey acted with the intent to harm or defraud Owens. The trier of fact only had to “reasonably infer that [Ramsey] knew the instrument was forged beyond a reasonable doubt.” The State argued that a jury could have rationally concluded that circumstantial evidence was enough to prove Ramsey’s guilt. Specifically, the state argued that even if Ramsey did not forge the check himself, because he was the beneficiary and the memorandum noted that the payment was for “contract labor” that he did not complete, he should have known that the check was forged. The State also argued that Stuebgen could be distinguished and was not controlling in this case. Stuebgen applied the abandoned alternative-hypothesis construct, “which does not require the same deference to the jury’s resolution of factual issues.” Also, unlike Stuebgen, Ramsey’s access to the checkbook was nearly exclusive because he was the only employee of Owens and lived in the same shop where the checkbook was kept. The appellant argued that there was insufficient evidence to show that the check was forged. As an alternative argument, the appellant contended that Jimmie had been taking pain medication and could have forgotten writing the check to Ramsey.
The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appellant’s “pain-medication” argument because a jury had already heard the testimony and reasonably declined to believe the appellant’s contention. The court also found it difficult to accept the argument that a reasonable jury could find that the appellant had no knowledge of the forgery. To find for Ramsey, a jury would have to believe that a third party wrote a check in a manner and handwriting similar to Jimmie Owens, for the same purpose (contract labor) as other checks made out to Ramsey, and payable to Ramsey himself. Then the jury would have to believe that Ramsey cashed the check with no knowledge of these events. The court had trouble believing that a reasonable jury would find this way. The court also agreed with Justice Pirtle in holding that Stuebgen was distinguishable and the reasonable-alternative-hypothesis was abandoned by Jackson and the incorrect standard to rely on. The court held that proper application of the Jackson standard, “which requires that the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction,” made the evidence sufficient to uphold the appellant’s conviction.
JUDGE MEYERS, dissenting.
Judge Meyers agreed with the majority that the evidence was sufficient to show the appellant’s attempt to intentionally defraud or harm, but believed that Owens Motor Machine was defrauded and not Jimmie Owens himself. This fact was significant because forgery against “elderly individuals” increases the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony. Because the check was written from the account of Owens Motor Machine and not Jimmie Owens himself, the evidence suggested that Ramsey actually defrauded the business. For this reason, Judge Meyers contended that the conviction should not be upheld, or at the very least Ramsey should be afforded a new punishment hearing.