Stairhime v. State
No. PD-1071-14
Case Summary written by Austin De Boer, Staff Member.
JUDGE YEARY delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Ryan Stairhime was indicted for murder. During voir dire, the trial court sustained three of the state’s objections to the manner in which Stairhime’s counsel phrased a question to the venire. At the close of voir dire, the trial court asked, “whether either party ha[d] ‘an objection to the panel or as to the jury as selected.’” Both Stairhime and the state answered, “No, Your Honor.” Ultimately, the jury convicted Stairhime and sentenced him to forty-three years in prison.
On appeal, Stairhime raised four points of error. His fourth point of error noted the trial court erred “by refusing to allow him to propound a specific question in a specific way to the venire.” The First Court of Appeals dismissed each of his claims. Specifically, the court of appeals relied upon its own opinion in Harrison v. State, 333 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist. 2010, pet. ref’d) to conclude Stairhime “waived any error he might have earlier preserved” when he did not object at the close of voir dire. As a result, Stairhime filed a petition for discretionary review with the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Issue: Whether “the [First Court of Appeals] correctly regarded [Stairhime’s] answer to constitute waiver of his appellate complaint that he [was] denied the opportunity to pose a proper question.”
The Court of Criminal Appeals applied its rationale from Thomas v. State, 408 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) to clarify the use of the “no objection” waiver rule. The court held the “no objection” waiver rule is “context-dependent.”
Traditionally under the “no objection” waiver rule, one may affirmatively waive previously preserved error through a “clear and unequivocal statement on the record.” If the record shows that counsel did not affirmatively intend to waive previously preserved error, then the appellate court should resolve the claim on the merits. If the record is unclear, however, then the appellate court should “resolve the ambiguity in favor of a finding of waiver.” Any determination must be based on the context of the question.
Here, the Court of Criminal Appeals held Stairhime’s response to the trial court’s question, in context, did not amount to waiver. Justice Brown of the First Court of Appeals noted in his concurring opinion that “at [that] moment in the trial . . . the attorneys are focused on examining their strike sheets . . . evaluating the other party’s strikes, and analyzing the resulting composition of the jury.” This court adopted Justice Brown’s rationale. It is at that moment when the trial court asked if either party had an objection to the “seating of the jury,” or “to the panel,” or “to the jury as selected.” The trial court’s inquiry did not invoke or reference an objection to previous aspect of voir dire; rather it focused on the composition of the jury.
In that context, the court concluded Stairhime did not intend to waive any previously preserved error and the trial court likely did not believe he intended to do so either. The possibility that Stairhime intended to waive previously preserved error was so remote that it did not create enough ambiguity that would require the court to resolve “in favor of a finding of waiver.”
As a result, the court held that “a reply of ‘No’ or ‘No, your Honor’ to the question of whether there is an objection to ‘the seating of the jury’, or ‘to the panel,’ or ‘to the jury as selected at the conclusion of the jury selection does not constitution waiver.” The Court also overruled Harrison v. States, 333 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist. 2010, pet. ref’d) to the extent that its rationale conflicted with that of this court.
Because the First Court of Appeals dismissed Stairhime’s fourth point of error based on an incorrect analysis of the issues in this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the case.